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I. INTRODUCTION  
At the outset, I wish to express my deep gratitude to the FIU Law 
Review, and our good friend, Professor Charles Jalloh for organizing this 
fascinating seminar on codification and progressive development of 
international law in commemoration of the seventieth anniversary of the 
International Law Commission (the “Commission”). 
The mandate of the Commission is progressive development and 
codification—well, technically the mandate of the Commission is “the 
promotion of progressive development of international law and its 
codification.”1 Progressive development is said to be “the preparation of draft 
conventions on subjects which have not yet been regulated by international 
law or in regard to which the law has not yet been sufficiently developed in 
the practice of States” while codification refers to “the more precise 
formulation and systematization of rules of international law in fields where 
there already has been extensive State practice, precedent and doctrine.”2 In 
simple terms the technical meaning of the phrase “progressive development” 
refers to activities of the Commission when the practice of States in a certain 
area cannot be said to meet the requirements for customary international law 
i.e., widespread and consistent practice coupled with opinio juris, while 
 
* Professor of International Law, University of Pretoria; Member of the UN International Law 
Commission and its Special Rapporteur on Jus Cogens. This paper was written during time as Global 
Visiting of Professor of Law the University of California Irvine on a Fulbright Research Grant. 
1 1947 Statute of the International Law Commission, art 1.  
2 Id. at art. 15. 
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codification refers to those cases where there is widespread practice accepted 
as law, i.e., customary international law. In a recent article, I described the 
distinction as follows: 
In other words, codification refers to circumstances where 
the rule in question is lex lata or hard law. Progressive 
development . . . refers to instances where there is some 
practice but the practice would not, strictly speaking, meet 
the requirements for customary international law. Rules 
advanced as progressive development may be ‘emerging 
rules’ but they have to have some basis in state practice.3  
Several caveats should be made. First, whether the Commission is 
engaged in an exercise of progressive development or codification, its work 
is always (or should always be) based on the existence of practice. In the case 
of progressive development, the practice need not be widespread, consistent, 
or accompanied by opinio juris (acceptance as law), but it should be present. 
Second, and more importantly, in its practice, with some exceptions, the 
Commission has not generally identified individual provisions in a given 
topic as either progressive development or codification. In its practice, the 
Commission has regarded “the distinction between the two processes as 
unworkable” and has, rather, proceeded on the basis of a “composite idea of 
codification and progressive development.”4 Third, in the context of the topic 
“immunities of state officials from foreign criminal jurisdiction” some 
members of the Commission have introduced a third category of the outputs, 
called, pejoratively, “new law.”5 This category applies, it seems, to those 
provisions of the Commission’s work that have no basis in the practice of law 
and thus constitutes neither progressive development nor codification.6 
Against this background, this contribution to the seminar will address 
the topic of peremptory norms of general international law (jus cogens), for 
which I serve as Special Rapporteur. I will in this paper address how this 
 
3 Dire Tladi, The International Law Commission’s Recent Work on Exceptions to Immunity: 
Charting the Course for a Brave New World in International Law?, 32 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 169, 172 (2019); 
Dire Tladi, The International Law Commission’s Draft Articles on the Protection of Persons in the Event 
of Disasters: Codification, Progressive Development or Creation of Law from Thin Air?, 16 CHINESE J. 
INT’L L. 425, 426 (2017) [hereinafter Tladi, Draft Articles]. 
4 UNITED NATIONS, THE WORK OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION 47 (8th ed. 2012). 
5 See, e.g., Statement by Murphy, U.N. ILC, 69th Sess., Provisional Summary Record of the 
3362nd Meeting, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SR.3362 (2017); Statement by Wood, U.N. ILC, 69th Sess. 
Provisional Summary Record of the 3360th Meeting, UN Doc. A/CN.4/SR.3360 (2017). 
6 In fairness to these members, although not using the phrase “new law,” I myself had described 
the Commission’s work on the topic of “Protection of Persons in the Event of Disasters” as neither 
codification nor progressive development and had, for that topic, said the Commission had created law 
“out of thin air.” See Tladi, Draft Articles, supra note 3, at 426. 
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framework of codification and progressive development—perhaps also “new 
law”—has influenced my work as Special Rapporteur and the Commission’s 
own approach to the reports of the Special Rapporteur. 
In the next section I describe the genesis of the topic. In the context of 
the topic peremptory norms of general international law (jus cogens), which 
I will from this point on refer to simply as “the topic jus cogens,” the genesis 
of the topic is of particular importance since one of the key issues in 
determining whether to place the topic on agenda was the question of 
existence of practice. I will then, in section 3, discuss the role of practice in 
the four reports7 submitted thus far, including in the responses to the reports 
by members of the Commission and States.8 I will then offer some concluding 
remarks. 
II. THE GENESIS OF THE TOPIC JUS COGENS  
When I proposed the topic jus cogens I was fully aware of how special 
the concept was. I knew that I had to approach the topic with a degree of awe 
because as special concepts in international law go, few can rival jus cogens. 
To understand the concept of jus cogens and how special it is, it is important 
to remember that the system of international law is essentially a horizontal 
one. First, in this horizontal system, the subjects of law make the law 
themselves, which means they are free, as a rule, to contract out of existing 
rules of international law. Second, in a properly horizontal system of law, 
there is no hierarchy and all rules have equal status. Yet jus cogens departs 
from these essential characteristics of international law in that rules of jus 
cogens, first, cannot be contracted out of—they are non-derogable—and, 
second, these norms are hierarchically superior to other rules of international 
law. This is nothing less than revolutionary!9 It is thus not surprising that the 
word “magic” has so often been associated with the concept of jus cogens.10 
 
7 See Dire Tladi (Special Rapporteur), First Rep. on Jus Cogens, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/693 (Mar. 8, 
2016) [hereinafter Tladi, First Report]; Dire Tladi (Special Rapporteur), Second Rep. on Jus Cogens, U.N. 
Doc. A/CN.4/706 (Mar. 16, 2017) [hereinafter Tladi, Second Report]; Dire Tladi (Special Rapporteur), 
Third Rep. on Peremptory Norms of General International Law (Jus Cogens), U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/714 
(Feb. 12, 2018) [hereinafter Tladi, Third Report]; Dire Tladi (Special Rapporteur), Fourth Rep. on 
Peremptory Norms of General International Law (Jus Cogens), U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/727 (Jan. 31, 2019) 
[hereinafter Tladi, Fourth Report]. 
8 Tladi, Fourth Report, supra note 7, ¶ 16.  
9 Alain Pellet, Conclusions, in THE FUNDAMENTAL RULES OF THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL 
ORDER: JUS COGENS AND OBLIGATIONS ERGA OMNES 417, (Christian Tomuschat & Jean-Marc 
Thouvenin eds., 2005) [hereinafter THE FUNDAMENTAL RULES].  
10 Andrea Bianchi, Human Rights and the Magic of Jus Cogens, 19 EUROPEAN J. INT’L L. 491 
(2008); Dinah Shelton, Sherlock Holmes and the Mystery of Jus Cogens, 46 NETH. Y.B. INT’L L. 23 
(2015); see also Anthony D’Amato, It’s a Bird, It’s a Plane, It’s Jus Cogens, 6 CONN. J. INT’L L. 1, 2 
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But the full measure of the extraordinary character of jus cogens is perhaps 
captured in the remarks of Alain Pellet, who observed that the concept of jus 
cogens shared the same initials (JC) as someone who, a long time ago, turned 
water into wine.11 All of this illustrates just how special jus cogens is.  
It is because of this magical, revolutionary and perhaps miraculous 
quality that when I first proposed the topic, I had fully expected that the 
Commission would decide not to take up the topic. My intention had then 
been that, after the rejection by the Commission, I would go off and write a 
book—without by the way, the constraints of practice. It was thus a surprise 
when the Commission decided that it would take the topic up. But the 
decision was, by no means, easy and there were certainly objections raised. 
The objections were, in many ways, related to the theme of this seminar—
progressive development and codification and the role of practice.12 One 
member suggested that, whatever the state of practice, some topics, like jus 
cogens, should be “above the glass ceiling” and that the Commission should 
avoid taking on such topics. This concern spoke to the magical, revolutionary 
or miraculous character of jus cogens. I confess that I also had some 
trepidation about pursuing this topic; fear that the Commission, a generally 
conservative body, might do some damage to the evolution of the concept—
a fear that, as will become apparent, was not far-fetched. A consequence of 
this “glass ceiling” objection for practice—and the progressive 
development/codification dichotomy—was that the Commission would have 
to handle the topic carefully, including by ensuring that its conclusions were 
backed by practice. In this respect, when talking to my students about the 
Commission’s work on jus cogens I will always remind them about Ian 
Brownlie’s quip that jus cogens was like a car stuck in garage. I tell them that 
the project of the Commission is an attempt to get the car out of the garage. 
Yet, as much as you want the car out of the garage, you don’t want to be 
giving the car keys to your sixteen-year-old son to go on a joy-ride, especially 
if the car is a Bentley, as jus cogens would certainly be if it were a car. So, 
my intention as Special Rapporteur was to fully ensure that the work done 
was consistent with practice.  
The second objection, which was that shared by several members of the 
Commission, was that there simply was not sufficient practice to justify 
taking this topic on. It will be recalled that in its commentary to Draft Article 
 
(1990) (“Indeed, the sheer ephemerality of jus cogens is an asset, enabling any writer to christen any 
ordinary norm of his or her choice as a new jus cogens norm, thereby in one stroke investing it with 
magical power.”). 
11 Alain Pellet, Conclusions, in THE FUNDAMENTAL RULES, supra note 9, at 217. 
12 Since the discussions took place in the context of the Working Group on the Long-Term 
Programme of Work—a closed meeting—I am not in a position to ascribe the views to specific members 
of the Commission. 
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50 of the 1966 Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties, the Commission made 
the following observations: 
The emergence of rules having the character of jus cogens is 
comparatively recent, while international law is in the 
process of rapid development. The Commission considered 
the right course to be to provide in general terms that a treaty 
is void if it conflicts with a rule of jus cogens and to leave 
the full content of the rule to be worked out in State practice 
and in the jurisprudence of international tribunals.13  
The argument by members of the Commission that raised the concern 
about including the topic on the agenda of the Commission was that there had 
not been sufficient practice in the period since the adoption of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties to justify further study on the topic of jus 
cogens. This argument was raised by both members of the Commission and 
States in the General Assembly. Three States in particular raised the concern. 
France was no surprise, it had been opposed to the concept of jus cogens for 
sometime and had raised a number of concerns, including the lack of 
practice.14 Spoiler alert: I, as Special Rapporteur, did not consider France as 
a persistent objector to the doctrine of jus cogens—assuming persistent 
objection had any role whatsoever to play in relation to jus cogens. This no 
doubt elicited a strong reaction.15 It was equally understandable that the 
United States, the most powerful State in the world—politically, 
economically and militarily—would be suspicious of a concept such as a jus 
cogens since, by definition, jus cogens is intended to restrict power. The US 
was thus another State to object to jus cogens, and it did so principally from 
the perspective that there was not sufficient practice to justify its inclusion in 
the agenda of the Commission. The one surprise was The Netherlands. Its 
objection to the study jus cogens was the one surprise that, as Special 
 
13 1966 ILC Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties, ¶ 3 of Commentary to Draft art. 50.  
14 In describing France’s objection to the inclusion of the topic to my students, I have often said it 
threw everything plus the kitchen sink and hoped that one of missiles would bring the topic down. Another 
issue that France raised was, whatever the merits of the topic, the Commission’s agenda was too full, and 
the inclusion of a new topic would overburden the Commission. 
15 See Tladi, Second Report, supra note 7, at ¶ 17 (“It is true, as France noted, that the practice of 
France was of particular interest to the Special Rapporteur. This was because France was known as having 
objected to the very idea of jus cogens. Yet actual practice, as seen from the statements of France itself, 
shows this to be inaccurate. The assessment was not concerned with whether France is or is not a persistent 
objector and nowhere does the first report draw any conclusions in this respect. All that the report states, 
with regard to France, is the well-documented fact that, at the adoption of the Vienna Convention, France 
did not object to the idea of jus cogens. Rather, France expressed concern about the lack of clarity 
concerning how it would be applied and the possibility for its abuse.”). 
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Rapporteur, I did not foresee. The Dutch objection to taking up the topic was 
also based on the lack of practice.  
A third objection, not related to practice and referred to here only for 
completeness sake, was that an illustrative list of jus cogens—the final 
element proposed for study—would be too difficult and the Commission 
would never reach agreement.16  
III. JUS COGENS IN THE WORK OF THE COMMISSION 
It is perhaps useful to begin with the first report of the Special 
Rapporteur and the Commission’s consideration of that report. As Special 
Rapporteur, my intention with the first report was to get a soft landing. The 
first report therefore focused on what I perceived to be non-controversial 
issues, with support in both practice and doctrine. The first report therefore 
provided an immemorable historical description of the emergence of jus 
cogens and a description of what was commonly accepted as the definition 
and characteristics of jus cogens. It was meant to facilitate a kumbaya spirit 
within the Commission before the heavy lifting of the second and third report 
began—boy, was that perception misplaced! 
The first report proposed three draft conclusions which, in my view as 
Special Rapporteur and law professor, were relatively uncontroversial. The 
first draft conclusion, a scope provision, simply provided what this topic 
concerned. This was indeed uncontroversial. The second draft conclusion 
sought to explain the general structure of international law as a horizontal 
legal system where most rules were jus dispositivum, which could be 
contracted out of. The provision would then spell out that this general rule 
was subject to the exception that was jus cogens. This draft conclusion was 
based on a large quantity of international judicial practice.17 There was also 
 
16 The member of the Commission that held this view famously said drawing up a list “could be 
done either in five minutes or it would take fifty years.”  
17 North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Ger. v. Den.; Ger. v. Neth.), Judgment, 1969 I.C.J. 3, ¶ 72 
(Feb. 1969) (“Without attempting to enter into, still less pronounce upon any question of jus cogens, it is 
well understood that, in practice, rules of international law can, by agreement, be derogated from in 
particular cases, or as between particular parties.”). For a more explicit recognition of the distinction 
between jus cogens and jus dispositivum see South West Africa Cases (Eth. v. S. Afr.; Liber. v. S. Afr.), 
Second Phase, Judgment, 1966 I.C.J. 6, at 298 (July 1966) (dissenting opinion of Tanaka, J.) (“jus cogens, 
recently examined by the International Law Commission, [is] a kind of imperative law which constitutes 
the contrast to the jus dispositivum, capable of being changed by way of agreement between States.”); 
Maritime Delimitation in the Area between Greenland and Jan Mayen (Den. v. Nor.), Judgment, 1993 
I.C.J. 38, ¶ 135 (June 1993) (separate opinion by Shahabuddeen, J.) (“States are entitled by agreement to 
derogate from rules of international law other than jus cogens.”); see Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay 
(Arg. v. Uru.), Judgment, 2010 I.C.J. 14,¶ 43 (Apr. 2010) (separate opinion of Ad Hoc Torres, J.) (“As the 
rules laid out in Articles 7 to 12 of the Statute of the River Uruguay are not peremptory norms (jus cogens), 
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ample State practice in support of this very basic principle.18 This basic 
principle was also largely accepted in the doctrine.19 Yet in that first year 
(2016), to my utter surprise, only one member supported this basic 
proposition.20 This draft conclusion was therefore dead on arrival. 
The real fight, however, was the proposal in the first report that norms 
of jus cogens were hierarchically superior to other norms, universally 
applicable, and reflected and protected the fundamental values of the 
international community. This draft conclusion, to me, almost went without 
 
there is nothing to prevent the Parties from deciding by ‘joint agreement.’”); Prosecutor v. Kupreškić et 
al., Case No, IT-95-16-T, Judgment, ¶ 520 (Jan. 14 2000) (“most norms of international humanitarian law, 
in particular those prohibiting war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide, are also peremptory 
norms or jus cogens, i.e. of a non-derogable and overriding character.”); Reservations to the Convention 
on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Advisory Opinion, 1951 I.C.J. 15, at 24 
(May 1951) (“The object and purpose of the Convention thus limit the freedom of making reservation.”); 
The Oscar Chinn Case (U.K. v. Belg.), Judgment, 1934, P.C.I.J. (Ser. A/B No. 63), at 149 (Dec. 1934) 
(separate opinion of Schüking, J.) (“And I can hardly believe that the League of Nations would have 
already embarked on the codification of international law if it were not possible, even to-day, to create a 
jus cogens, the effect of which would be that, once States have agreed on certain rules of law, and have 
also given an undertaking that these rules may not be altered by only some of their number, any act adopted 
in contravention of that undertaking would be automatically void.”); Right of Passage over Indian 
Territories (Port. v. India) Merits, Judgement, 1960 I.C.J. 6 ¶ 29 (Apr. 1960) (dissenting opinion of 
Fernandes, J.) (“Several rules cogentes prevail over any special rules. And the general principles to which 
I shall refer later constitute true rules of ius cogens, over which no special practice can prevail.”); Military 
and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. 
14, at 199 (June 1986) (separate opinion of Sette-Cama, J.); Arbitral Award of 31 July 1989 (Guinea-
Bissau v. Sen.), Judgment, 1991 I.C.J. 53, at 155 (Nov. 1991) (dissenting opinion of Weeramantry, J.) 
(“[A] treaty which offends against a rule of jus cogens, though complying fully with all the requirements 
of procedural regularity in its creation, can still be null and void owing to a factor lying outside those 
procedural formalities.”); Nuclear Tests Case (Austl. v. Fr.), Judgment, 1974 I.C.J. 253 ¶ 389 (Dec. 1974) 
(dissenting opinion of de Castro, J.) (discussing wherein the jus cogens status of a treaty provision is 
questioned because of, inter alia, the right to withdraw).  
18 See also R.M. v. Attorney General, et al. (2006) 2010 K.L.R. 1, 12 (High Court of Kenya at 
Nairobi); Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina, 965 F.2d 699, 715–16 (9th Cir. 1992).  
19 ALEXANDER ORAKHELASHVILI PEREMPTORY NORMS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 8–9 (2006); 
Alfred Verdross, Jus Dispositivum and Jus Cogens in International Law, 60 AM. J. INT’L. L. 55, 58 (1966) 
(“There was clearly consensus in the Commission that the majority of the norms of international law do 
not have the character of jus cogens.”); Christian Tomuschat, The Security Council and Jus Cogens, in 
THE PRESENT AND FUTURE OF JUS COGENS 19 (Enzo Cannizzaro ed., 2015) (“Most of the rules of 
international law are jus dispostivum.”); Merlin Magallona, The Concept of Jus Cogens in the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of the Treaties, 51 PHIL. L.J. 521 (1976) (“jus dispositivum rules which can be 
derogated by private contracts.”); see also Levan Alexidze, The Legal Nature of Jus Cogens in 
Contemporary International Law, in 172 RECUEIL DES COURS: COLLECTED COURSES OF THE HAGUE 
ACADEMY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 245 (1981-III); ALDANA ROHR, LA RESPONSABILIDAD 
INTERNACIONAL DEL ESTADO POR VIOLACIÓN AL JUS COGENS 5 (Buenos Aires, 2015) (“por un lado, 
aquellas de naturaleza dispositive–jus dispositivum–las más numeosasa, creada por aacurdo de voluntades, 
derogables también por acuerdos de voluntades” [“most of the rules [of international law] have a 
dispositive character–jus dispostivum–created by an agreement of wills, which can also be derogated by 
an agreement of wills”]).  
20 See Statement of Caflisch in Support of the Draft Conclusion, U.N. GAOR, 68th Sess., 33144th 
mtg. at 9–10, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SR/3314 (July 4, 2016). 
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saying and its premise was so basic that it did not require substantial 
justification. Professor Jalloh, the organizer of this symposium, before he 
became member of the Commission, when I told him of the push-back I got 
from some members of the Commission, quipped, “But I thought this was 
international law 101.”21 Moreover, this basic notion was supported by 
wealth of State practice and decisions of international courts and tribunals.22 
Yet some members of the Commission—Wood, Murphy, Nolte, Forteau, 
Gervogian and Huang—opposed this provision. In the composition of the 
Commission in 2016, the objections of these few members were sufficient to 
stall the adoption of this provision by the Drafting Committee. While those 
members that were opposed to these characteristics were in the minority, they 
wielded sufficient power and influence to prevent the adoption, even by the 
Drafting Committee, of the provision. Unlike the provision on the distinction 
between jus dispositivum and jus cogens this provision was one which I, as 
Special Rapporteur, was willing to “fall on my sword” for—indeed if the 
Commission could not adopt this basic rule, I would have resigned as Special 
Rapporteur. Thus, while I was willing to withdraw the proposal on the 
distinction between jus cogens and jus dispositivum, these basic 
characteristics of jus cogens were a red line for me—I could not proceed as 
Special Rapporteur if the Commission were not willing to accept these 
characteristics, more so because they were supported by practice.23 
The following year, 2017, the Commission was reconstituted after an 
election, and its new composition, not only overwhelmingly supported the 
provision as a basic tenant of existing law but insisted on its adoption by the 
Drafting Committee. Given the strong support in practice, the text stating that 
jus cogens was hierarchically superior to other norms of international law 
was universally applicable and was a reflection (and protection) of the 
fundamental values of the international community, was overwhelmingly 
 
21 Quoted with permission from Professor Jalloh. 
22 See Prosecutor v. Furundžija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, Judgment, ¶ 153 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the 
Former Yugoslavia Dec. 10, 1998) (a feature of the prohibition of torture “relates to the hierarchy of rules 
in the international normative order. . . . this principle has evolved into a peremptory norm or jus cogens, 
that is, a norm that enjoys a higher rank in the international hierarchy than treaty law and even ‘ordinary’ 
customary rules.”); Armed Activities on Territory of Congo (New Application: 2002) (Dem. Rep. Congo 
v. Rwanda), Judgment, 2006 I.C.J. 6, ¶ 10 (Feb. 3) (separate opinion of ad hoc Dugard, J.); see also Arrest 
Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Belg.), Judgment, 2002 I.C.J. 3, ¶ 7 (Feb. 14) (dissenting 
opinion of Al-Khasawneh, J.); Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of Its Sixty-Third and Sixty-Fifth 
Sessions, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/68/SR.25, ¶ 101 (Dec. 2, 2013) (statement by Mr. Van Den Bogaard 
(Netherlands): “Jus cogens was hierarchically superior within the international law system, irrespective 
of whether it took the form of written law or customary law.”). But see ROBERT KOLB, PEREMPTORY 
INTERNATIONAL LAW—JUS COGENS: A GENERAL INVENTORY 37 (2015) (suggesting that the language of 
hierarchy should be avoided and that the focus should be on voidness since the former concept—of 
hierarchy—leads to confusion and misunderstanding). 
23 Tladi, Second Report, supra note 7, at 10–15. 
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adopted by the Drafting Committee with the general support of States. It is 
hard to describe the contested draft conclusion as anything but codification—
codification in the American tradition of restatement of laws. States, too, 
overwhelmingly supported these characteristics.24 Only a few States did not 
support the characteristics.25  
The second report, which focused on the criteria for peremptoriness, did 
not raise many issues of substance. Many of the comments focused on the 
drafting proposals, suggesting that the draft conclusions could be 
streamlined. As with the first report, the draft conclusions were based on 
practice of States, in particular decisions of national courts, and international 
jurisprudence. The excitement of the topic jus cogens returned during the 
consideration of the third report. The third report covered effects or 
consequences of jus cogens. The report divided the effects of jus cogens into 
five categories: effects on treaties, effects on other sources of law (customary 
international law, unilateral declarations and decisions of international 
organizations), effects on State responsibility, and finally effects on 
individual criminal responsibility.  
On the effects of jus cogens on treaties, the main question concerned 
dispute settlement. It is this question that I wish to focus on. Should a State 
be entitled, without the benefit of a third-party dispute settlement procedure, 
to claim that a treaty was void and thus extricate itself from obligations freely 
assumed? Those States that had reservations about jus cogens when the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties was adopted raised this very issue. 
They argued that including the provision in the Convention would risk 
destabilizing treaty relations. The compromise arrived at was the inclusion of 
Article 66, which provided that the invalidity of a treaty on account of jus 
cogens was subject to a dispute settlement procedure.26 On the one hand, this 
provision was an essential basis for the inclusion of Article 53 of the Vienna 
Convention, so that excluding it would be problematic. On the other hand, 
there was no practice supporting this provision at all; i.e., in all the time of 
the Vienna Convention, it had never been relied on, not even as an instrument 
of rhetoric. Courts, both domestic and international, States in their statements 
before international organizations, and authors in their writings routinely 
referred to invalidation of treaties (and other rules) as a consequence of jus 
 
24 For a summary of the views of the States on the characteristics proposed by the Special 
Rapporteur, see Tladi, Second Report, supra note 7, at 6–7, and Tladi, Third Report, supra note 7, at 5–6. 
25 States that explicitly rejected these characteristics were China and the United States. See Tladi, 
Second Report, supra note 7, at 13.  
26 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 66(a), May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (“Any 
one of the parties to a dispute concerning the application or the interpretation of article 53 or 64 may, by 
a written application, submit it to the International Court of Justice for a decision unless the parties by 
common consent agree to submit the dispute to arbitration” if the dispute is not resolved through amicable 
procedures). 
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cogens, but rarely linked this with dispute settlement procedure. Moreover, 
many States that were party to the Vienna Convention had entered 
reservations stating that they do not recognize the application of Article 66. 
To link the invalidation of the treaty on account of inconsistency with jus 
cogens to the dispute settlement provisions of Article 66 would thus be going 
beyond codification and moving into the realm of progressive development 
and maybe even new law, since there was virtually no practice. The third 
report therefore proposed, in an effort to be responsive to these factors that 
pulled in opposite directions, a provision on “recommended practice.” This 
was a clear indication that the provision was not codification and ought to be 
treated as progressive development. 
Members of the Commission were divided.27 Others expressed concern 
that a provision that was clearly mandatory under the Vienna Convention on 
the Law of Treaties was being downgraded to the status of a recommended 
procedure which was not binding. Other members, on the other hand, 
objected that the proposed provision sought to make what was not binding 
on States that were not party to the Vienna Convention and which, in some 
cases, had been expressly rejected by even States party to the Vienna 
Convention, into a rule that was generally binding. Of course, neither of these 
(extreme) arguments were convincing. In response to those who sought to 
strengthen the provision, the work of the Commission is aimed at codifying 
and progressively developing general international law. It is not meant to 
(and cannot) affect existing treaty regimes applicable between States, save 
where those treaty regimes are contrary to jus cogens. Thus, it is wrong to 
suggest that not including the dispute settlement provision in an obligatory 
language would have the effect of downgrading it for those States that are 
party to the Vienna Convention. Of course, whatever the Commission’s draft 
conclusions may say (or not say) about dispute settlement, those States that 
are party to the Vienna Convention, and which have not entered reservations 
to Article 66, would continue to be bound, as a matter of treaty law, by Article 
66 of that Convention. The argument of downgrading was thus a red herring. 
Those who argued that the proposed provision would make binding a rule 
that some States had specifically rejected were also overstating the case. The 
fact is that a provision titled “recommended procedure” and crafted in 
hortatory language is by definition non-binding, and there was nothing in the 
proposed draft conclusion that suggested otherwise. 
The challenge for the Commission remained to find a balance between 
preventing unilateral determination of the invalidity of treaties by some 
States, on the one hand, and on the other hand, preventing a State from 
insisting on the validity of a treaty that is inconsistent with a norm of jus 
 
27 See Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of Its Seventieth Session, U.N. Doc. A/73/10, at 231 
(2018). 
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cogens by withholding consent to third party dispute settlement. Without 
sufficient practice subsequent to the Vienna Convention, the Drafting 
Committee relied on the elements of Article 66, as treaty practice, elements 
of the proposal of the Special Rapporteur and a little common sense, to come 
up with a text which is, without question, progressive development and which 
should meet the two competing interests. The text provides for amicable 
solutions and, in the event that there is no amicable solution, it provides that 
“the objecting State or States concerned offer to submit the matter to the 
International Court of Justice,” and that “the invoking State may not carry 
out the measure which it has proposed until the dispute is resolved.”28 In other 
words, if the State objecting to the claim that the treaty conflicts with a norm 
of jus cogens does not offer to submit the matter for settlement by the 
International Court of Justice, the State invoking the invalidity of the treaty 
may treat the treaty as invalid on account of conflict of with jus cogens. If, 
on the other hand, the objecting State offers its consent to the jurisdiction of 
the Court, the invoking State cannot rely on the invalidity unless there has 
been a judicial settlement—in other words, a condition for reliance on the 
invalidity of the treaty is accepting the offer for judicial settlement. The 
provision, thus, simply provides an incentive on both the objecting and 
invoking State to seek third party judicial settlement, without suggesting a 
legal obligation to do so. The provision adopted, to my mind, qualifies as a 
“progressive development of international law and its codification,” i.e., it 
represents what the Commission has referred to as a “composite idea of 
codification and progressive development.” 
The fourth report, which at the time of writing has yet to be debated, has 
also been based largely on practice.29 This fourth report, which covers the 
question of an illustrative list, however, proceeds from the assumption that 
the list of examples of norms of jus cogens provided by the Commission in 
the commentary to the Articles on States Responsibility is accurate. The 
norms identified by the Commission as examples of jus cogens are the 
prohibition of aggression, the prohibition of genocide, the prohibition of 
slavery, the prohibition of crimes against humanity, the prohibition of war 
crimes, the prohibition of torture, the prohibition of apartheid and racial 
discrimination, and the right to self-determination.30 When the Commission 
presented the list in 2001, it offered little authority for why, in its view, these 
norms were jus cogens. The fourth report proceeds from this list, and tests 
whether the practice of States and decisions of international courts and 
 
28 See Charles Chernor Jalloh (Chairperson of the Drafting Committee), Oral Interim Rep. on 
Peremptory Norms of General International Law (Jus Cogens), at 15–16 (July 26, 2018).  
29 See generally Tladi, Fourth Report, supra note 7. 
30 Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of Its Fifty-Third Session, U.N. Doc. A/56/10, at 85 
(2008). 
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tribunals offer support for the list identified by the Commission. In each case 
the report concludes that there is ample support in State practice and the 
jurisprudence of the international courts and tribunals that the norms 
identified by the Commission in 2011 are accepted and recognized as norms 
from which no derogation is permitted. What the report does not do, is to 
assess whether the practice emerged as a result of the list or whether the list 
was based on existing practice at the time of the adoption of the Articles on 
States Responsibility. That question, while interesting, is immaterial for the 
purposes of codification and progressive development. What matters is that 
it can be shown that, as the law currently exists, the norms identified in the 
Commission’s work in 2001 are norms of jus cogens.  
It is unlikely that these norms will raise significant debate within the 
Commission—although with this Commission, more straightforward things 
in the realm of international law 101 have been known to be questioned. The 
real question—or criticism—will be of other norms not listed in the report. 
In other words, it is expected that some members, and some States, will pose 
the question of why other norms that arguably meet the criteria for jus cogens 
have not been included in the list. As Special Rapporteur, in thinking about 
whether to have an illustrative list, it became apparent that an illustrative list 
would, necessarily, always be subject to criticism: why this norm and not that 
one. More importantly, it also became clear that an attempt to draw up a list 
would fundamentally change the nature of the topic. The topic jus cogens—
like the topic identification of customary international law and unlike other 
topics like crimes against humanity, immunity of State officials, or the 
protection of the environment in relation to armed conflict—is inherently a 
methodological topic and not one concerned with the substance of particular 
rules of international law. An attempt to draw up a list would require delving 
into the substance of several topics. On the other hand, it was also clear that 
many “stakeholders” were very interested in an illustrative list, and there 
would be serious disappointment if the Commission did not provide 
something approximating a list. I decided on a middle of the road approach. 
I would propose that the Commission, rather than embark on identifying an 
illustrative list, confirms the peremptory status of norms it had previously 
identified as jus cogens. As a second point, the commentary would refer to 
other norms whose jus cogens status was emerging or whose peremptory 
status had been championed. This second category of norms would be based 
on a more superficial study of practice. The norms identified in this category 
are enforced disappearance, the right to life and non-refoulement. With 
respect to these norms, the fourth report suggests that there is some evidence 
of acceptance and recognition of non-derogability, but that the evidence is, 
as yet, inconclusive. The fourth report also looks at other norms which, 
though normatively deserving, have not generated the requisite support in the 
form of practice.  
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In its work on the topic jus cogens the Commission, and its attempt to 
stay true to its commitment of progressive development and codification, has 
often had to make decisions between consistency with the Vienna 
Convention and, on the other hand, reflecting current practice. Sometimes, 
the Commission—or rather the Drafting Committee, since the Commission 
has yet to adopt any text—has decided to “depart” from the text of the Vienna 
Convention and follow more closely the practice. This was the case with the 
characteristics. The Vienna Convention does not mention “hierarchical 
superiority,” “universal applicability,” or “fundamental values.” Although 
these characteristics are not included in the Vienna Convention, they are not 
inconsistent with it. They have emerged from the implementation and 
application of Article 53 and have become part of the fabric of the definition 
of jus cogens. At other times, the Drafting Committee has opted to stick, 
religiously, to the text of the Vienna Convention. The compromise text on 
the dispute settlement procedure is an example of the Drafting Committee 
creatively using the text of the Convention, while allowing practice to dictate 
what it includes and does not include. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The mandate of the Commission is the progressive development and 
codification of international law as a composite act. This composite act 
should always be based on State practice, the decisions of international courts 
and tribunals and underpinned by solid doctrine. The work of the 
Commission on jus cogens thus far completed has managed to keep the 
balance. Yet the Commission has faced two mutually defeating criticisms. 
On the one hand, a number of States—France, the United States, Turkey, the 
Czech Republic, Israel and a few others—have suggested, without 
substantiation, that the work on this topic has far thus been based on theory 
and doctrine and not practice. The fourth report, in refuting this attack made 
the following observations: 
It is difficult to respond to the criticism that the work of the 
Special Rapporteur and the Commission have followed a 
theoretical approach and have not relied on practice since 
none of the States have pointed to a single draft conclusion 
not supported by some practice. Although only a small 
minority of States made this allegation, it is so serious and 
damning that, exceptionally, some example to refute it are 
necessary. State Practice in the form of national judicial 
decisions, statements by States, treaty practice, resolutions 
of the General Assembly, and resolutions of the Security 
Council is provided in the report in abundance. The report is 
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also replete with invocations of international and regional 
jurisprudence.31  
Yet another completely contradictory criticism has been that the work 
of the Commission has not paid sufficient attention to theory and doctrine. 
One member of the Commission, and former Chair, has been the leading 
proponent of this line of attack. In the introduction of the first report, I alluded 
to Pellet’s clever reference to the initials of jus cogens being the same as 
someone who once turned water into wine. In his comment on the report, 
Valencia-Ospina picked up on this reference and suggested that by sticking 
to what had been said in case law, legislation, and the Vienna Convention, 
and by not exploring the theoretical complexities of jus cogens, the project 
would offer “more water than wine.” This criticism has been repeated 
methodically each year without fail by Valencia-Ospina. 
These criticisms confirm, at least to me, that the project is on the right 
track. At the very beginning, the first report emphasized that the object of the 
project was not to resolve theoretical debates—interesting though they may 
be.32 Rather, the objective would be to try to identify the existing law on jus 
cogens and to offer to States a proposal for progressive development and 
codification of international law on jus cogens by a careful, dispassionate 
assessment of practice. The accurate criticism that the work has paid too 
much attention to practice and not enough to theory does two things. First, it 
dispels the criticism of the few States that the work on the topic is based on 
theory and doctrine. Second, it confirms that the Commission has managed 
to strike the right balance in its composite mandate of progressive 
development of international law and its codification. We are not here to turn 
water into wine. We are merely here to purify the water, so that it may be 
potable. 
 
 
31 Tladi, Fourth Report, supra note 7, ¶ 20 (footnotes omitted).  
32 Tladi, First Report, supra note 7, at 6. 
